On February 6, the federal government's oldest tariff on imported solar panels quietly expired. For eight years, a tax called the "Section 201 safeguard" added up to 30% to the price of solar cells and finished panels shipped into the United States. By its final year, the rate had dropped to 14%. And under federal law, the government can't renew it. Eight years is the legal maximum for this type of tariff, and the clock ran out.
If you're buying solar panels for a US project, you might expect this to be good news. One less tax at the border, 14% off your import costs.
It's not that simple.
While this one tariff faded away, the government built a more aggressive set of trade barriers around solar imports. There are now at least four separate tariff programs covering solar panels, and they all stack on top of each other. The combined tax on a single shipment of panels from Vietnam, for example, can exceed 300% of the product's value.
The 14% you just saved may be the least consequential number on your customs bill.
How we got here
The tariff that just expired was created under Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974, a law that lets the President impose temporary import taxes when a flood of foreign goods is damaging an American industry. In 2017, two US solar manufacturers, Suniva and SolarWorld, asked the government for help. The International Trade Commission (ITC), the federal agency that investigates these claims, agreed that cheap imported solar panels were hurting domestic producers.
President Trump set the tariff in January 2018 via Presidential Proclamation 9693. It started at 30% and dropped 5 percentage points each year during its original four-year term. A limited quantity of imported solar cells, 2.5 gigawatts' worth, were allowed in without the tariff so that US panel assemblers could still get the cells they needed as raw materials.
In February 2022, Biden extended the tariff for four more years and doubled that duty-free allowance to 5 GW. He also kept an exemption for bifacial solar panels, a design that captures sunlight from both the front and back of the panel.
By the time the tariff expired on February 6, 2026, it had largely stopped working. Companies had found ways around it. Timothy Brightbill, trade counsel to the Alliance for American Solar Manufacturing and Trade, told Solar Power World that the tariffs "lost their effectiveness," calling the remedies "largely ineffective, due to the lengthy exemption for bifacial products."
The domestic industry's lawyers weren't waiting around. They were building something more aggressive.
What replaced it: four layers deep
The government now uses four different legal authorities to tax imported solar products. Each one was created under a different law, targets different countries, and works differently. They all apply at the same time. The total tax on any shipment depends on where the panels were made, which company made them, and which of these four programs apply.
Dumping and subsidy penalties on Southeast Asian panels
This is the biggest layer.
When a foreign company sells products in the US at a price below what it charges at home (or below its cost of production), that's called "dumping." When a foreign government gives its manufacturers financial help that lets them undercut American competitors, those payments are called "subsidies." US law allows the government to impose penalty tariffs to offset both practices. These are called antidumping duties (AD) and countervailing duties (CVD).
On April 24, 2024, a coalition of US solar manufacturers including First Solar, Qcells, Mission Solar, and Convalt Energy asked the Commerce Department to investigate solar panels from Cambodia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam. Those four countries supplied about 84% of US solar imports.
Commerce confirmed the violations on April 21, 2025. The penalty rates were steep.
Cambodia: dumping penalties up to 125%, subsidy penalties up to 3,404%. Malaysia: dumping up to 81%, subsidy up to 169%. Thailand: dumping up to 203%, subsidy up to 800%. Vietnam: dumping up to 271%, subsidy up to 543%.
Those numbers need context. The extreme rates are penalties for companies that refused to cooperate with the investigation. The government assigns them the worst possible rates as a consequence. Companies that cooperated received much lower rates. Hanwha Q Cells' factory in Malaysia, for example, received a 0% dumping penalty and a 14.64% subsidy penalty.
But even the lower rates are significant. And they don't exist alone.
The ITC issued its final ruling in June 2025 confirming that imports from all four countries were injuring the domestic industry, and Commerce locked the penalty tariffs into place as formal orders on June 24, 2025.
One finding stood out: Commerce determined that manufacturers in all four countries were receiving financial support from the Chinese government, not just from their own governments. These "transnational subsidy" findings are among the first of their kind. They confirmed what the industry already knew but the legal system hadn't caught up with: China's effort to control the solar supply chain doesn't stop at China's borders.
Reciprocal tariffs
On top of the dumping and subsidy penalties, solar imports face a second set of tariffs that the Trump administration imposed under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) starting April 5, 2025. These "reciprocal tariffs" are meant to match trade barriers that other countries impose on US goods. The base rate is 10%, with higher rates for specific countries: Vietnam at 46%, Cambodia at 49%, Thailand at 36%, Malaysia at 24%.
These tariffs are being challenged at the Supreme Court in Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump, with a ruling expected any day after February 20. If the Court strikes them down, this entire layer of costs disappears. If it doesn't, these tariffs stack on top of the dumping and subsidy penalties.
We covered the IEEPA case and how to protect potential refund rights in our February 9 analysis. That guidance applies to solar importers too.
China-specific tariffs
Solar products shipped directly from China face a 50% tariff under Section 301, a trade law focused specifically on unfair Chinese trade practices. That rate doubled from 25% in September 2024. The raw material used to make solar cells, polysilicon, and the thin wafers cut from it carry the same 50% rate as of January 2025. Combined with the reciprocal tariff of 125%+ on Chinese goods, importing solar products directly from China is effectively impossible.
This has been the reality for years. Almost no solar panels ship directly from China to the US anymore. Manufacturers moved production to Southeast Asia instead, which is exactly what triggered the dumping and subsidy investigations described above.
The chase continues: India, Indonesia, and Laos
On July 17, 2025, the same coalition of US manufacturers filed a new round of petitions, this time targeting India, Indonesia, and Laos. Their argument: manufacturers are relocating production from the four Southeast Asian countries that just got hit with penalties to these three countries to avoid paying the new tariffs.
Commerce opened investigations on August 7, 2025. The alleged dumping margins are large: India at 214%, Indonesia at 90%, Laos up to 249%. Imports from these three countries totaled $1.6 billion in 2024. The investigation was delayed by the government shutdown, with final determinations now due by July 4, 2026.
This matters if you're currently buying from India. With a 27% reciprocal tariff and no dumping or subsidy penalties yet, India has been one of the cheaper import options. If this investigation results in new tariffs, that cost advantage disappears.
The pattern is hard to miss. The first case hit China in 2012. The second hit China and Taiwan in 2015. A follow-up investigation caught Southeast Asian factories with Chinese ownership in 2023. The third round imposed full penalty tariffs on Cambodia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam in 2025. The fourth targets India, Indonesia, and Laos now. Every time production moves to a new country to dodge tariffs, the trade lawyers follow.
The pending wildcard: a national security investigation into polysilicon
On July 1, 2025, Commerce launched a separate investigation into whether the United States' dependence on imported polysilicon threatens national security. This investigation uses Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act, the same authority used to impose tariffs on steel, aluminum, and, more recently, semiconductors.
The deadline for Commerce to deliver its findings to the President is March 28, 2026. Six weeks from now. The administration has signaled it wants to move faster.
Polysilicon is the base material that solar cells are made from. Think of it as the silicon equivalent of crude oil for the petroleum industry: it's where the supply chain starts. China produces over 90% of the world's supply. The investigation covers not just raw polysilicon but also "derivatives," a term Commerce hasn't precisely defined. It could include the processed forms of polysilicon (ingots and wafers) as well as the finished cells and panels made from them.
One industry group, the Coalition for a Prosperous America, has proposed specific tariff rates: $0.20 per watt on finished solar panels, $0.10/W on cells, $0.07/W on wafers, and $10 per kilogram on polysilicon, with reduced rates for imports from allied countries.
Two things make this investigation different from the Section 201 tariff that just expired. Section 232 tariffs have no time limit. Section 201 was capped at eight years. Section 232 can last indefinitely. And they can be applied retroactively, meaning the government could impose tariffs on polysilicon that already entered the country before the decision was announced. Companies have been stockpiling polysilicon in anticipation of the ruling. That stockpile may not be safe.
We covered the Section 232 semiconductor tariff last month. The administration used that authority for a targeted 25% duty on advanced AI chips. The polysilicon action could follow a similar approach.
Buying American is more realistic than ever
The tariff wall is only half the story. The other half is what's happening inside the US.
American solar panel manufacturing capacity has reached roughly 50 GW (including factories under construction), up from 14.5 GW in 2023. A gigawatt is roughly enough to power 750,000 homes. First Solar has built up to 14 GW of domestic capacity across factories in Ohio, Alabama, and Louisiana, with a fifth plant planned in South Carolina, using a proprietary thin-film technology that doesn't require the same polysilicon supply chain as conventional panels. Qcells is building the only fully integrated solar manufacturing plant in the United States, in Cartersville, Georgia, one that takes raw materials all the way through to finished panels, targeting 8.4 GW of capacity.
This buildout is supported by a federal tax credit called Section 45X, created by the Inflation Reduction Act. It pays US manufacturers a per-unit credit for producing solar components domestically. Congress considered repealing it during the budget reconciliation process, but the One Big Beautiful Bill Act largely kept the credit intact, adding restrictions on components that involve certain foreign governments but not moving up the expiration date, which remains 2030. First Solar has already sold $700 million worth of these credits to the financial services company Fiserv at $0.96 per dollar of credit value.
The gap is earlier in the supply chain. Cell manufacturing, the step before final panel assembly, is projected at 19 GW by 2026, covering roughly half of domestic demand. The steps before that, turning polysilicon into ingots and slicing those into wafers, are even further behind. Qcells' Georgia facility is essentially the only significant domestic source for those steps, and it has faced delays. Until these earlier production stages catch up, even American panel assemblers still depend on imported materials. Tariff changes on those materials still hit their costs.
What this means for your buying decisions
Here's what the combined tariff picture looks like by country, now that Section 201 is gone. These tariffs stack. A shipment can be subject to all applicable layers at once.
China: 50-60% under Section 301 + 125%+ reciprocal tariff + older dumping/subsidy penalties = effectively impossible to import from.
Vietnam: 46% reciprocal + dumping penalties up to 271% + subsidy penalties up to 543% = prohibitive for most exporters.
Cambodia: 49% reciprocal + dumping penalties up to 125% + subsidy penalties up to 3,404% = same story.
Malaysia: 24% reciprocal + dumping penalties of 0-81% + subsidy penalties of 15-169% = the least expensive Southeast Asian option, especially through Hanwha Q Cells' factory there. Still costly.
Thailand: 36% reciprocal + dumping penalties up to 203% + subsidy penalties up to 800% = costly.
India: 27% reciprocal + no dumping/subsidy penalties yet = currently one of the cheaper options, but that could change if the ongoing investigation produces new tariffs.
Turkey: 10% reciprocal + no dumping/subsidy penalties = the lowest-tariff import option available today.
US domestic: No tariffs + manufacturing tax credits = the most cost-competitive option where factory capacity is available.
The buying question isn't "how much is the tariff on solar panels?" anymore. It's "which factory made these panels, what are that specific company's penalty rates, which of the four tariff programs apply, and could a pending investigation change these numbers in six months?"
Practical takeaways
Your team can assign these actions this week:
- Build a sourcing chart by country and manufacturer. There's no single tariff rate for "imported solar panels" anymore. Map each potential supplier to its specific penalty rates, reciprocal tariff rate, and any pending investigations that could change the picture. If you're buying from Southeast Asia, you need the manufacturer's specific rate from Commerce's final determination.
- Run two cost models for India. If you're buying from India to avoid the Southeast Asian penalties, model what happens if the current investigation produces new tariffs on Indian products. Have a backup supply plan ready.
- Ask your suppliers where their polysilicon comes from. If your supply chain uses Chinese-origin polysilicon at any stage, even if the panels are assembled somewhere else, a Section 232 tariff on polysilicon could raise your costs. If your suppliers can't answer this question, that tells you something.
- Get bids from US manufacturers for your next project. With roughly 50 GW of domestic panel capacity and manufacturing tax credits bringing down producers' costs, the price difference between imported and American-made panels is shrinking. For large projects where lead times allow it, request bids from First Solar, Qcells, and other domestic producers.
- Renegotiate your purchase contracts. If your agreements lock in a fixed price without a clause that adjusts for tariff changes, that's a risk. The tariff picture is shifting quarterly. Contracts should spell out who bears the cost if import duties go up, and include a mechanism for adjusting the price when rates change.
- If you're a US manufacturer claiming 45X credits, check your supply chain. The new FEOC restrictions bar the credit for components produced with material assistance from certain foreign governments. Treasury must publish compliance guidelines by December 31, 2026. Until then, get written certifications from your suppliers and follow IRS Notice 2025-08.
- Brief your board on the tariff shift. The old Section 201 tariff was predictable: a published rate that dropped by a set amount each year. The new regime is different. Dumping and subsidy penalties are set individually for each manufacturer and can change in annual government reviews. Section 232 tariffs have no expiration date. Frame this as a permanent change in how solar project costs work, not a one-time price adjustment.
What we're watching
- Section 232 polysilicon decision (due by March 28, 2026). Could impose tariffs on polysilicon and every product made from it, with no time limit and the possibility of retroactive application. A presidential announcement could come with little warning.
- India/Indonesia/Laos investigation (date TBD). Commerce's preliminary penalty rates were delayed by the government shutdown. When they land, importers will be required to post cash deposits at those rates immediately.
- Supreme Court IEEPA ruling (expected after February 20). If the Court strikes down the reciprocal tariffs in Learning Resources v. Trump, the 10-49% reciprocal tariff layer goes away. See our February 9 analysis for how to prepare.
- Section 45X compliance tables (due December 31, 2026). These will spell out which foreign-origin components disqualify manufacturers from claiming the domestic production tax credit. US manufacturers need to know what's in their supply chains well before this deadline.
Looking ahead
The old Section 201 tariff was a single, straightforward tax: one rate, applied to all imported solar panels, with a built-in expiration date. What replaced it is a web of overlapping programs, each with its own rules. Dumping and subsidy penalties are tailored to individual manufacturers and reviewed every year. Section 232 tariffs, if imposed on polysilicon, would have no expiration. And the pattern of new investigations means that every time production moves to a new country, a new trade case follows close behind.
The expiration of Section 201 isn't a simplification. The government's approach to solar energy sector trade enforcement has shifted from one broad tariff to a set of trade barriers that are more targeted, more durable, and harder to avoid. The companies that update their sourcing, their contracts, and their regulatory compliance posture will build projects on budget. The ones that hear "the solar tariff expired" and stop reading will get surprised at the border.
This analysis reflects publicly available information as of February 16, 2026. Companies should consult qualified trade counsel for guidance specific to their import operations and tariff exposure.